In a designated verifier proxy signature scheme, one can delegate his or her signing capability to another user in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former, but the validity of the resulting signatures can only be verified by the designated verifier. Several designated verifier proxy signature schemes have been proposed so far. However, most of the schemes were proven secure in the random oracle model, which has received a lot of criticism since the security proofs in the random oracle model are not sound with respect to the standard model. In this paper, we propose a new construction of designated verifier proxy signature whose security can be proven without using the random oracle model. Our scheme is inspired by Waters' Identity-based encryption. The unforgeability of our scheme is based on the hardness of Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. As far as we know, this is the first designated verifier proxy signature secure in the standard model.
Introduction
The concept of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo et al. [1] in 1996. In a proxy signature scheme, the original signer can delegate his or her signing capability to a proxy signer and then the proxy signer can create valid signatures on behalf of the original signer. When a verifier receives a proxy signature, he should not only verify the correctness by a given verification procedure, but also be convinced of the original signer's agreement on the signed message. Proxy signature schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, including electronic commerce, e-cash and distributed shared object systems. According to the type of delegation, proxy signatures can be classified into three types: full delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant. Based on the knowledge of the proxy private key, proxy signatures can be classified into proxy-protected and proxy-unprotected. In a proxy-protected scheme, only the proxy signer can generate valid proxy signatures, while in a proxy-unprotected scheme, either the original signer or the proxy signer can produce proxy signatures since both of them have a knowledge on the proxy private key. In many applications, proxy-protected proxy signature schemes are required to avoid the potential dispute between the original signer and the proxy signer. Many new proxy signature schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been proposed till now and moreover, combined with other signatures with particular properties, some new kinds of proxy signature have been proposed, such as proxy blind signature [11] , proxy multi-signature [12] , threshold proxy signature [13] , proxy ring signature [14] and so on.
Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo [15] introduced a new primitive named designated verifier proofs in 1996. Such a proof enables a prover Alice to convince a designated verifier Bob that a statement is true, while Bob cannot use the proof to convince others of this fact, since Bob himself can simulate such a proof. Furthermore, Jakobsson et al. proposed a designated Roadmap: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some preliminary works are given in Section 2. The formal models of designated verifier proxy signature scheme is described in Section 3. Our designated verifier proxy signature scheme without random oracles is presented in Section 4. We analyze the proposed scheme in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will review some fundamental backgrounds used in this paper, including bilinear pairings and complexity assumptions.
Bilinear pairings
Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p and g be a generator of G. The map e : G × G → G T is said to be an admissible bilinear pairing if the following conditions hold true.
(1) e is bilinear, i.e. e(g
(3) e is efficiently computable.
We refer the reader to [26] for more details on the construction of such pairings.
Complexity assumptions
abc and 0 otherwise.
The probability that a polynomial bounded algorithm A can solve the GBDH problem is defined as
Formal models of designated verifier proxy signature
In this section, we will describe the outline and the security requirements of designated verifier proxy signature schemes.
Outline of designated verifier proxy signature
There exists three participants in a designated verifier proxy signature scheme, namely Alice, Bob and Cindy, who act as the original signer, the proxy signer and the designated verifier respectively. A designated verifier proxy signature scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, this algorithm outputs the system parameters.
• KeyGen: It takes as input the security parameter k and outputs the secret-public key pair (sk i , pk i ) for i ∈ {a, b, c} denotes Alice, Bob and Cindy.
• DelegationGen: Given the system's parameter, the original signer's private key and the warrant W to be signed, this algorithm outputs the delegation σ W .
• ProxySign: This algorithm takes as input the proxy signer's private key sk b , the delegation σ W , the designated verifier's public key pk c and a message m to generate a signature σ .
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm that accepts a message m, the warrant W , a signature σ , the original signer and the proxy signer's public key (pk a , pk b ), the designated verifier's private key sk c and returns if the signature is valid, otherwise returns ⊥ indicating the signature is invalid.
• Transcript simulation: An algorithm that accepts a message m, a warrant W and the verifier's private key sk c to produce an identically distributed transcript σ * that is indistinguishable from the original designated verifier proxy signature σ .
Security notions
There are three types adversaries in the system. Type 1 adversary A 1 only has the public keys of Alice and Bob. Type 2 adversary A 2 has the public keys of Alice and Bob, he additionally has the secret key of the original signer Alice. Type 3 adversary A 3 has the public keys of Alice and Bob, he additionally has the secret key of the proxy signer Bob.
One can find that if a designated verifier proxy signature scheme is unforgeable against Type 2 and Type 3 adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type 1 adversary. In a warrant-based proxy signature scheme, the delegation is original signer's standard signature on the warrant which contains proxy's public key, a period of validity, the restrictions on the messages that the signer can sign and so on. Therefore, this kind of proxy signature can prevent the misuse of the delegation.
Attack model
Existential unforgeability against adaptive A 2 adversary
The existential unforgeability of a designated verifier proxy signature scheme under a type 2 adversary requires that it is difficult for the original signer to generate a valid proxy signature of a message M * under the warrant W * that has not been signed by the proxy signer. It is defined using the following game between the challenger C and a type 2 adversary A 2 .
• Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm to obtain system's parameters, runs KeyGen algorithm to obtain the secret-public key pairs (sk a , pk a ), ( The success probability of an adversary A 2 wins the above game is defined as Succ A 2 . We say that a type 2 adversary A 2 can (t, q ps , q v , ) break a designated verifier proxy signature scheme if A 2 makes at most q ps proxy signature queries, q v verification queries in time at most t and Succ A 2 is at least .
Existential unforgeability against adaptive A 3 adversary
Inspired by the work of [20] , we provide a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a designated verifier proxy signature scheme against Type 3 adversary. It is defined using the following game between an adversary A 3 and a challenger C.
• Setup: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain system's parameters, runs KeyGen algorithm to obtain the secret-public key pairs (sk a , pk a ), (sk b , pk b ), (sk c , pk c ) of the original signer Alice, proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy, respectively. C then sends (pk a , pk b , pk c , sk b ) to the adversary A 3 .
• Delegation queries: A 3 can request the delegation on the warrant W . The challenger C runs the DelegationGen algorithm to obtain σ W and returns it to A 3 .
• ProxySign queries: A 3 can request a designated proxy signature on the pair (M, W ) with the original signer Alice, the proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy. In response, C outputs a signature σ and returns it to A 3 .
• Verify queries: A 3 can request a signature verification query on a pair (M, W , σ ) with the original signer Alice, the proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy. C outputs if σ is a valid designated verifier proxy signature on M, or ⊥ otherwise.
• Output: Finally, A 3 outputs a new pair (M * , W * , σ * ), such that
(1) W * has not been requested as one of the delegation queries.
(2) (M * , W * ) has not been requested as one of the proxy signature queries. (3) σ * is a valid designated verifier proxy signature of the message M * under the warrant W * for the original signer Alice, the proxy signer Bob and the designated verifier Cindy.
The success probability of an adversary A 3 wins the above game is defined as Succ A 3 . We say that a type 3 adversary A 3 can (t, q w , q ps , q v , ) break a designated verifier proxy signature scheme if A 3 makes at most q w delegation queries, q ps proxy signature queries, q v verification queries in time at most t and Succ A 3 is at least .
Designated verifier proxy signature scheme without random oracles
In this section, we describe our designated verifier proxy signature scheme. As assumed earlier, there are three participants in the system, namely Alice, Bob and Cindy, who act as the original signer, the proxy signer and the designated verifier. In the following, all the messages to be signed will be represented as bit strings of length n. To construct a more flexible scheme which allows messages of arbitrary length, a collision resistant Hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n should be employed. Our scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Setup:
The system parameters are as follows. Let (G, G T ) be bilinear groups where |G| = |G T | = p for some prime p, g is the generator of G. e denotes an admissible pairing ProxySign: Let M be an n-bit message to be signed by the proxy signer Bob and M i denotes the i-bit of M, and M ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which M i = 1, the proxy signature is generated as follows. First, the proxy signer Bob picks two random values r a , r b ∈ Z p . Then the proxy signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) on M is constructed as:
Verification: To check whether σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) is a valid proxy signature on the message M under the warrant W , Cindy uses her secret key to verify whether the following equation holds. .
Analysis of the scheme
In this section, we will firstly show the correctness of our scheme. Then we prove that our scheme is secure against all types of adversaries.
Correctness
The correctness of the scheme can be directly verified by the following equations. , g Setup: B sets an integer l = 4q ps and chooses an integer k, uniformly at random between 0 and n. B then chooses some random numbers (x a , y a , r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ Z p . Additionally, B chooses a value x and a random n-vector, x = (x i ) where x , x i ∈ Z l . Finally, B picks randomly a value y and a random n-vector, y = (y i ) where y , y i ∈ Z p . These values are kept internal to B.
Again, for a message M and a warrant W , we let M ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and W ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which M i = 1 and W i = 1. For ease of analysis, we define three functions F (M), J(M) and K (M) just as in Waters' scheme [25] .
otherwise.
Then B sets the public keys of the users and common parameters as follows.
( • If K (M) = 0, B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
• .
We can obtain as the value of e(g, g) abc .
This completes the description of the simulation. Now we have to assess B's probability of success. B will not abort if both the following conditions hold.
A: B does not abort during the ProxySign queries.
The success probability of B is Succ abc with the help of the GBDH oracle O DBDH . B will run A 3 as a subroutine and act as A 3 's challenger. B will response A 3 's queries as follows. a , b , and other two integers, k a , k b , uniformly at random between 0 and n. Then it chooses two values x a , x b and two random n-vectors, two values y a , y b and two random n-vectors y a = (y ai ), y b = (y bi ) where y a , y b , y ai , y bi ∈ R Z p . B keeps all the values secret.
Setup: B chooses two integers
Again, for a message M and a warrant W , we let M ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and W ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which M i = 1 and W i = 1. For ease of analysis, we define six functions [25, 9] .
(1) B assigns the public keys of the original signer and designated verifier as Note that, at this time,
Delegation queries: Suppose A 3 issues a delegation query for an n-bit warrant W .
(1) If K a (W ) = 0, B terminates the simulation and reports failure. [25] , B can construct the delegation of this warrant by choosing a random r a ∈ Z p and computing: 
ProxySign queries: Suppose A 3 issues a designated verifier proxy signature query for an n-bit message M under the warrant W .
( , pk cx
, pk cx )
x c e(pk bx , pk by ) Verify queries: Suppose A 3 issues a verify query for the message/signature pair σ = (M, W , σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ). 
is a valid BDH tuple.
If B does not abort during the simulation, A 3 will output a valid designated verifier proxy signature σ * = (σ * as the value of e (g, g) abc .
This completes the description of the simulation. Now we have to assess B's probability of success. B will not abort if the following conditions hold. The success probability is Succ
ε. Now we compute this probability using Waters' technique [25] . 
Conclusion
We have proposed a new designated verifier proxy scheme and have proven that the scheme is secure without random oracles. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first designated verifier proxy signature scheme that can be proven secure in the standard model. The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
